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Hazzard: Comment

COMMENT
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
It is a welcome opportunity to comment on Professor Morgan's
thoughtful exposition.' I agree with the three basic standards of counselling that he posits.2 However, Professor Morgan's formulation of
the first two standards masks difficulties that may be worth bringing
into focus. When account is taken of these difficulties, Professor Morgan's formulation ultimately may be agreeable primarily because of
the general terms in which it is cast. At this level of generality, it
would be hard for anyone to disagree, even those whose views may
be as different as Professors Freedman, 3 Luban, 4 and Simon.5 At the
same time, the formulation of Professor Morgan's third standard may
be too narrow.
According to Professor Morgan's first standard, a lawyer's "professional function" is to assist a client to 'take appropriate advantage of
lawful opportunities. '6 For the moment, let us ignore the meanings
pregnant in the term "appropriate." Thus simplified, Morgan asserts
that a lawyer "may" assist a client in pursuing lawful opportunities.
This general formulation raises the issue of whether Morgan uses the
term "may" to refer consistently to norms emanating from the same
normative order as the term "lawful."
Let me first explain the term "normative order." All of us act
within several simultaneously coexisting normative orders, and for
each of us these orders are concentric upon one's self as a specific
individual. One normative order is the law, meaning the positive law
of the polity of which we are residents. For lawyers, standards emanating from the legal order include the Rules of Professional Conduct
governing lawyers.7 Other legal standards include the statutory prohi-

*Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., 1953, Swarthmore College; LL.B., 1954,
Columbia University School of Law.
1. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REv. 439 (1990).
2. Id. at 445.
3. Professor Monroe Freedman is currently the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor Legal Ethics at Hofstra University School of Law. AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
341 (1990).
4. Professor David Luban is currently a professor of jurisprudence at the University of
Maryland School of Law. Id. at 541-42.
5. Professor William Simon is currently a professor of law at Stanford University. Id. at 760.
6. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 445.
7. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (setting forth rules
of professional conduct for attorneys).
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bition on mail fraud8 and as Professor Morgan notes, the common law
concerning agency.9
A second normative order for a lawyer is the professional ethic
prevailing in the group of lawyers with whom the particular lawyer
identifies. The legal profession is extremely heterogeneous. The lawyer
in the "elite" big-firm practice in a specific city may define this role
in different ways than the small-firm practitioners within the same
city, or than a lawyer in big-firm practice in another city. The definition
of one's peer group within the profession has not only functional dimensions but normative ones as well. A normative standard recognized
within a particular professional peer group may require a more or less
exacting standard than what the law specifies. For example, in one
professional peer group it may be impermissible to take a default
judgment against an opposing lawyer without a warning telephone
call, even though the standard of the law clearly allows a lawyer to
do so without such a warning.
The drafters of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the
Code) took some notice of this problem. Indeed, at least one provision
of the Code incorporates a local professional standard by reference,
making it a legal standard as well. Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(5) provides: "[A lawyer shall not] [f]ail to comply with known local customs
of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without
giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his intent not to comply."",
A third normative order for many lawyers emanates from the religious group with which the lawyer is affiliated. This normative order
may impose more exacting standards upon the lawyer than those of
either the law or the lawyer's peer reference group. For example, the
religious group may strongly condemn "taking advantage" of others.
Such a restriction may be subject to a subcategorization, however, so
that it operates differently when applied to "coreligionists" rather than
to "outsiders."
Another normative order is the lawyer's personal moral system.
The terms of this order are revealed in such expressions as, "I don't
care. I'm not going to do it."
Professor Morgan's standard suggests that a lawyer "may" assist
a client in taking advantage of lawful opportunities.12 If the normative

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1990) (general federal mail fraud statute).
Morgan, supra note 1, at 456-57.
10. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) (setting forth
rules of professional conduct for attorneys).
11. Id. DR 7-106(c)(5).
12. Morgan, supra note 1, at 446-47.
8.
9.
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order referred to is the law, then Professor Morgan proposes that the
law permits a lawyer to assist a client in pursuing lawful opportunities.
So interpreted, the proposition is simply a statement of law and as
such is perhaps a tautology. I doubt that either Professor Freedman
or Professor Simon would disagree with the statement, as put in such
general terms.
However, the term "may" might not refer to the normative order
of the law, but rather to another normative order such as one of those
described above. If the law of civil procedure permits a default judgment to be taken without a warning telephone call to an opposing
attorney, but the norm recognized in the lawyer's reference group
prohibits such action, then the term "may" in Professor Morgan's
standard has at least two possible meanings. Hence, it would be a
matter of uncertainty and possible dispute whether taking a default
judgment without a warning telephone call is something a lawyer
properly "may" do for a client. In a professional peer group that
regarded the group's normative order as binding, despite the latitude
afforded by the law, a lawyer "may"not proceed unless adhering to
the convention requiring the telephone call. Using this interpretation,
then, Professor Morgan's proposition would be wrong, or at least
ambiguous.
This ambiguity can be explicated more fully if we consider the
justification that might be offered by a lawyer who felt bound by the
local convention concerning default judgments. He simply might say,
" 'May' doesn't mean 'must,' and I have professional discretion to refrain from taking full advantage of an opposing lawyer's lapse." This
protestation may be met with the response, "Aha! You pull your
punches, do you?" Such a response could elicit a more carefully framed
rejoinder: '"That sort of thing is not done in this legal community."
The lawyer might then start rummaging around in Professor Morgan's
formulation, ascertain that the term "professional" modifies "function
of a lawyer" and that "appropriate" modifies "advantage."'1 3 Solid
ground at last. The lawyer would say, relying on Professor Morgan's
standard, that while it may be "lawful" to take a default judgment
without a warning telephone call, it is not "professional" or "appropriate."
The same analysis applies to differences between the norms of the
legal order and the norms of a religious group to which the lawyer
belongs, or the norms of the lawyer's personal moral standards.
Now, if such is the structure of the normative orders in which the
lawyer is situated, and if one accepts that the non-legal normative
13. See id. at 445.
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orders have precedence in a specific case, then it is coherent to assert
that a lawyer may not pursue a lawful advantage for his client. On
the other hand, if the non-legal order does not have precedence, then
the command of the law is clear enough and the lawyer may take the
default. Furthermore, in the absence of some superseding group or
personal norm, it is difficult to see why the lawyer is not "obliged"
to take the default judgment. The norm of the law allows the lawyer
to do so, and the norms of both the law and professional ethics require
the lawyer to use best efforts in assisting the client. As stated in
comment (1) to Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
"A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate
a client's cause or endeavor .... -14
In any event, the discourse about what a lawyer "may" do is not
simply about the legal norms that govern the lawyer's conduct. Rather,
the discussion addresses the relationship between a legal norm (default
judgments may be taken without a telephone call) and a norm emanating from some other normative order, such as that in the lawyer's
peer group or in the lawyer's personal moral system.
If this analysis is correct, then it could clarify discussion of the
tensions between "law" and "morality." Moreover, it should be observed that the term "law" is ambiguous. "Law" can denote either
the positive law or some normative order that obtains legal status
within the legal profession or some segment of it. The term "morality"
is also ambiguous. It may refer to such things as community mores,
an individual's personal morality, or the ethical standards of some
designated group of right-thinking good citizens.
Essentially, a similar analysis can be applied to Professor Morgan's
second standard. This standard states that a lawyer should do no more
harm to a third party than "reasonably required" in the "legitimate
service" of the client's interests.15 As Professor Morgan demonstrates,
the law itself imposes important limitations on the harm that a lawyer
may inflict on third persons. These limitations may not be as exacting
as critics of the law wish. There are legitimate questions as to what
the law is and what it might become, and there is surely room to say
that the law ought to exact more from lawyers than it does currently.
That said, however, the law will never be coextensive with "morals," however defined. Only in the wildest utopian fantasies or the

14.
15.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 comment (1) (1983).

Morgan, supra note 1, at 445.
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most frightening Orwellian nightmares can we imagine that the law
should come to ordain what moralists say we should do unto one
another. To occupy the domain of morality, the law would have to
probe our innermost knowledge. Experience with witch hunts and
Stalinism suggests that law cannot achieve that ambition and that it
should forego attempting to do so. It is equally improbable that the
law's normative order will correspond to the norms of various subgroups within society - the legal profession, the business community,
the feminist community, and the academic community. Thus, what
the law regards as "reasonable" incidental harm, by Professor Morgan's standard, is unlikely to conform perfectly to the standard emanating from any other normative order - professional, religious, or personal.
If "reasonably required" refers to lawfully permissible harm to
third parties, Professor Morgan's standard is again a legal truism.
The law's mandate to minimize harm to the third party indeed is
simply the reciprocal of the mandate to maximize benefit to the client
only within the limits of the law. Of course, there may be disagreement
as to what the law permits or should permit. For example, arguably
the statute of limitations could be abolished or replaced by the equitable concept of laches. But clearly that is not what critics mean when
they say that a lawyer should not plead the statute of limitations
against a just debt. What they must mean is that pleading the statute
of limitations inflicts more harm on the creditor than is permitted by
some normative order other than the law.
Rarely is the identity of this alternative normative order clearly
specified. Perhaps it is that of all right-thinking good citizens. Maybe
it is simply the personal morality of the speaker. In any case, the
subject of the discourse is the discrepancy between what positive law
permits in the way of incidental harm to third party interests and
what some alternative normative regime permits. The first step in
the inquiry is to identify the normative order being referred to when
it is said that the law's norm is unfair. When this normative order
has been identified, the next question is whether the non-legal norm
should supersede or "trump" the legal norm governing the lawyer
and, if so, under what circumstances. This is a very complicated problem, more so than there is opportunity to explore here. However,
factors in an answer would seem to me to include the following:
In deciding what a lawyer properly may do for a client,
there are cases where a lawyer should submit to the dictates
of individual conscience and avoid finding guidance only in
what the law prescribes.
In deciding what a lawyer properly may do for a client,
-

-
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there are cases where a lawyer should submit to the dictates
of the law and not place reliance on what individual conscience prescribes.
- In resolving either of the foregoing dilemmas, the lawyer
should consider not only his or her individual identity as a
"lawyer" but also the lawyer's specific personal and societal
identity. The lawyer should also consider the corresponding
characteristics of the client.
The convention is that the "rules of professional ethics" apply to
all lawyers, regardless of their identity, situation in practice, or place
in the larger societal milieu. Of course, the legal norms of professional
conduct apply to all lawyers, regardless of identity or situation. It
does not follow, however, that the other normative orders in which
lawyers find themselves are all the same or speak with one voice. To
the contrary, such other normative orders differ from each other and
conflict with the dictates of the law in a wide range of circumstances.
To understand the nature of these conflicts, the beginning point is to
identify and articulate the content of the other normative orders by
which the lawyer is circumscribed.
As for Professor Morgan's third standard, one may accept that a
lawyer should exhibit "empathy, respect, and practical wisdom" toward a client.16 However, I wonder why these qualities should be
exhibited only toward clients. Allowance, of course, should be made
for the differences in the responsibilities that a lawyer owes to clients
as compared with the duties owed to "others." Those differences,
however, presumably are covered by Professor Morgan's first two
standards. Assuming compliance with those standards, why should
not a lawyer's "empathy, respect, and practical wisdom" extend to
adversaries, both opposing parties and professional opposite numbers?
That surely is not unthinkable. Indeed, Ethical Consideration 7-10 of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states: "The duty of a
lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his
concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved
in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.' 7
Perhaps division over this last proposition may underlie the divisions over other issues of lawyer "professionalism."

16.

Id.

17.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1980).
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